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THE ENFORCEABILITY OF PREDISPUTE
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS UNDER
10(b) AND 10b-5 CLAIMS
The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925' (Arbitration Act) provides that
courts of competent jurisdiction must enforce valid arbitration agreements. 2
Arbitration agreements are an attractive means of dispute resolution to
business parties because arbitration is an inexpensive and time-efficient
alternative to costly and lengthy litigation. 3 Relying on the Arbitration Act
and the positive attributes of arbitration, brokers and dealers of securities
often enter into private contracts with investors in which the contracting
parties agree to submit future contractual disputes to arbitration.4 An im-
portant issue arising from the use of arbitration clauses in contracts between
brokers and investors is whether federal courts must enforce agreements to
arbitrate section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims arising under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act).5 The United States Supreme Court in Dean
1. Federal Arbitration of Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982)).
2. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982); see infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text (discussing policies
and operation of Arbitration Act); infra notes 145-58 and accompanying text (discussing recent
United States Supreme Court trend strongly reaffirming validity of arbitration clauses).
3. See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (discussing advantages of arbitration
over litigation). See generally DouxE, Co RCtAL ARBrrRATioN § 1.01, at 1 (rev. ed. Wilkner
1984) (arbitration amounts to speedy inexpensive resolution of contractual disputes).
4. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 20397 (Nov. 18, 1983), reprinted in
[1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 83,452, at 86,356 [hereinafter cited as
Securities Release No. 20,3971. The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) stated that a typical
arbitration clause between a broker and an investor provides that arbitration will settle any con-
troversy between the investor and the broker-dealer arising out of their contractual relationship.
Id. at 86,357; see also SEC Securities Exchange Release No. 15,984 (July 2, 1979), reprinted
in [1979 Transfer Binderj FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,122, at 81,977 n.4 [hereinafter cited
as Securities Release No. 15,984]. The standard arbitration clause gives the customer the power
to elect the arbitration forum from a number of organizations. Securities Release No. 15,984,
supra, at 81,977 n.4. For example, the customer may choose to arbitrate before the New York
Stock Exchange or the American Stock Exchange. Id. Furthermore, if the customer fails to make
an election within five days of notice requesting the customer to select a forum, the broker-dealer
may select the forum. Id.
5. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78kk (1982)) ('34 Act); 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) (section 10(b)). Section
10(b) of the '34 Act provides that no party can employ manipulative or deceptive devices in
interstate commerce in connection with the sale or purchase of a security. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1982). Rule lOb-5, which the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgated pursuant
to section 10, provides that a manipulative act includes a misstatement or omission. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1985); see 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982) (providing SEC with power to promulgate rules
to enforce provisions of section 10 of '34 Act); infra notes 194-234 and accompanying text
(discussing whether courts must enforce arbitration agreements in context of claims under
section 10(b) of '34 Act); infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text (discussing application of
'34 Act and congressional passage of '34 Act). The issue whether section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
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Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd6 expressly left open the issue whether parties
can provide contractually for arbitration of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
claims. 7 Traditionally, federal courts have held that predispute arbitration
agreements are unenforceable in the context of claims under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 of the '34 Act. 8 Recently, however, the Supreme Court has
evinced a significant concern that courts enforce arbitration agreement which
may cast doubt on the arbitrability of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims. 9
In light of such intimations by the Supreme Court one federal circuit court
and a number of federal district courts have reversed the trend of denying
specific performance of arbitration agreements in the context of claims under
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.10 The arbitration issue especially is of compel-
claims are arbitrable is significant because brokers and investors should know the enforceability
of an arbitration agreement upon entering the investment contract. Absent judicial enforcement
of an arbitration agreement, either party possesses the capability of breaching a contractual
obligation and leaving the other party without the remedy of specific performance. See infra
note 26 and accompanying text (discussing congressional aim with passage of Arbitration Act
of putting arbitration agreements on equal basis with other contract provisions). The SEC has
prohibited the use of predispute arbitration agreements by enacting Rule 15c2-2. 17 C.F.R. §
240.15c2-2 (1984). Rule 15c2-2 declares as fraudulent a broker's use of predispute agreements
that attempt to bind customers to arbitration of future controversies arising out of the federal
securities laws. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2(a) (1984). The arbitrability of section 10(b) claims is still
an open question for claims arising out of contracts entered into before the Rule's January 1,
1983 effective date. Id.; see infra note 205 (fully discussing provisions and effect of Rule 15c2-
2).
6. 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985); see infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text (reciting facts
of Byrd ).
7. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 1240 n.1 (1985) (Supreme
Court in Byrd refused to decide issue of enforceability of predispute arbitration agreements for
claims arising out of section 10(b) of '34 Act). The United States Supreme Court recently granted
certiorari to resolve the issue of the enforceability of predispute arbitration agreements for claims
arising out of section 10(b) of the '34 Act. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., cert.
granted 55 U.S.L.W. 3231 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1986) (No. 86-44).
8. See, e.g., Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59, 61 (8th
Cir. 1984) (court cannot enforce arbitration agreement in context of section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 claims under '34 Act); Kershaw v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 734 F.2d 1327, 1328 (9th
Cir. 1984) (same); Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 437-38 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 432
U.S. 910 (1977); supra note 5 (describing provisions of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5); infra
notes 161-67 and accompanying text (discussing rationale of federal courts in traditionally
holding that section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims are nonarbitrable).
9. See Byrd v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 1244 (1985) (White, J., concurring)
(Justice White casts doubt on arbitrability of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims); Scherk v.
Albert-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 513-514 (1973) (United States Supreme Court casts doubt on
arbitrability of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims); see also Mitsibishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3354-55 (United States Supreme Court strongly
advocates policy of judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements); see infra notes 145-58 and
accompanying text (discussing recent United States Supreme Court trend strongly reaffirming
validity of arbitration clauses).
10. See, e.g., Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393 (8th
Cir. 1986) (enforcing arbitration of section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 claims pursuant to predispute
arbitration agreement); Finkle and Ross v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1505, 1509
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same); Ross v. Mathis, 624 F. Supp. 110, 115-17 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (same);
West v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 26, 28 (W.D. Wash. 1985) (same); see
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ling interest in light of the fact that, despite the perceived Supreme Court
trend to consistently enforce arbitration agreements, four federal circuit
courts, as well as, a number of federal district courts continue to deny
enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements in the context of claims
under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5."
Although the United States Supreme Court has not resolved the section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 arbitration issue, the Court has formulated a general
two-part test for courts to apply when determining whether to enforce an
agreement to arbitrate a federal statutory claim.' 2 Under the criteria set forth
in the Supreme Court decision of Mitsubishi Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 3 a court first must determine whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate the claim.' 4 If the court finds that the parties agreed to arbitrate
the claim, the court will examine the statutory language, the legislative
history, and the policy interests embodied in the particular federal statute
and analogous federal statutes to determine whether Congress intended to
proscribe the application of the Arbitration Act. 5 The court then will refuse
to enforce an agreement to arbitrate a federal statutory claim only if the
court finds that Congress intended to proscribe the application of the
Arbitration Act concerning that claim.' 6 Analysis of the section 10(b) and
infra notes 168-77 and accompanying text (discussing and listing increasing number of federal
district courts that enforce arbitration agreements and order arbitration of section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 claims).
I I. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 1197 (3d
Cir. 1986) (refusing to enforce predispute arbitration agreement in context of section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 claims); Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1986)
(same); McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986) (same) cert.
granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3231 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1986) (No. 86-44); Miller v. Drexel Burnham Lambert,
Inc., 791 F.2d 850 (11th Cir. 1986) (same); Webb v. Rowland & Co., Inc., 613 F. Supp. 1123
(E.D. Mo. 1985) (appeal pending) (same); Scharp v. Cralin & Co., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 476 (S.D.
Fla. 1985) (same); see infra notes 178-83 (discussing and listing number of federal circuit courts
and federal district courts that have continued to deny arbitration of claims under section 10b
and Rule lOb-5).
12. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3354-55
(1985); see infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text (discussing two-part test that United States
Supreme Court stated governs courts' determination of enforceability of arbitration agreements).
13. 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985); see infra notes 131-58 and accompanying text (discussing facts,
rationale, and holding of Supreme Court in Mitsubishi).
14. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3354. The Supreme Court has stated that a strong federal
policy exists favoring judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements through a series of cases.
Id. at 3349. The parties' intention when entering a contract controls a court's decision concerning
whether the parties meant to be bound by an arbitration agreement. Id. If a court finds that
fraud or overwhelming unequal bargaining power tainted the agreement, the court may revoke
the arbitration agreement. Id.; see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)
(Arbitration Act embodies national policy favoring judicial enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)
(courts should resolve doubts concerning scope of arbitration of issues in favor of arbitration).
15. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3355. The Mitsubishi Court stated that the Arbitration Act
embodied a strong federal policy favoring judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements. Id.
at 3349. Consequently, the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi enforced an arbitration agreement in
the context of antitrust claims. Id. at 3355; see infra notes 131-58 and accompanying text (fully
discussing facts and import of Mitsubishi case).
16. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3355.
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Rule lOb-5 arbitration issue under the Mitsubishi test, including an investi-
gation of the pertinent statutes and case precedent, suggests that courts not
enforce agreements to arbitrate section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims despite
a recent Supreme Court trend embracing a federal policy of judicial enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements.' 7
Under the Mitsubishi test, a court considering whether to enforce an
agreement to arbitrate section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 claims first must deter-
mine whether the parties actually agreed to arbitrate the claims.", If the court
finds that the parties agreed to arbitrate the section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
claims, the court under the Mitsubishi test then must examine the statutory
language and legislative history of the Arbitration Act, the Securities Act 9
('33 Act), and the '34 Act to determine whether to enforce the arbitration
agreement. 20 Congressional enactment of the Arbitration Act represented a
forthright repudiation of the long standing judicial practice of refusing
specific enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements. 2' Prior to the
Arbitration Act, a party could refuse to submit a controversy to arbitration,
an action amounting to a breach of the party's contractual obligations, and
a court would refuse to order specific enforcement of the agreement to
arbitrate.22 The judiciary's abhorrence of arbitration agreements amounted
to judicial jealousy of any party's attempt to preempt the court's jurisdic-
tion.23 As litigation became more protracted and expensive, however, busi-
17. See infra notes 194-224 and accompanying text (suggesting that courts not enforce
agreements to arbitrate section 10(b) and Rule lob-S claims).
18. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3354.
19. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 77a-77bbbb (1982)) ('33 Act).
20. See Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3355 (Congress must evince intention that particular
federal law precludes arbitration); infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text (discussing Arbitra-
tion Act and federal securities laws).
21. See S. RE,. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1924) (Arbitration Act enforces
arbitration agreements and overturns archaic law of invalidity of arbitration clauses); H.R. REP.
No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 1 (1924) (arbitration agreements are matters of contract and
unenforceability is an anachronism); Note, Mixed Arbitrable and Nonarbitrable Claims: Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 34 CATH. U. L. REv. 525, 529 (1985) (Arbitration Act established
new federal policy supporting validity of arbitration agreements).
22. Cohen & Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Act, 12 VA. L. REv. 265, 270 (1926).
Before congressional enactment of the Arbitration Act, businesses were accustomed to the
revocability of arbitration clauses because courts did not consider arbitration agreements in the
same light as other contractual agreements. Id. Consequently, when a party refused to comply
with an arbitration agreement, the party did not comprehend that such an action amounted to
a breach of a contractual obligation because courts refused to enforce the arbitration provisions
of a contract. Id.
23. See Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall) 445, 451 (1874) (American law entitles
every citizen to resort to courts and person can not bargain away such rights); Dickson Mfg.
Co. v. American Locomotive Co., 119 F. 488, 490 (M.D. Pa. 1902) (parties can not contract
to oust court of jurisdiction); Mitchell v. Dougherty, 90 F. 639, 644-45 (3d Cir. 1898) (settled
principle that parties cannot contract through arbitration clauses to oust court of jurisdiction
based on fear of damaging administration of justice); S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
1, 2 (1924) (jealousy and fear of parties ousting judiciary of jurisdiction compelled judiciary to
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nessmen and courts began to recognize the logical necessity for legislative
actions authorizing specific enforcement of arbitration agreements. 24 Con-
gress acknowledged that the speedier, more inexpensive alternative of arbi-
tration would relieve the courts of the burdens associated with increased
litigation.25 Congress, furthermore, recognized that public policy supports
specific performance of arbitration agreements because an arbitration agree-
ment is a contractual obligation and an injured party generally is entitled to
judicial remedy if another party breaches a contract clause. 26 Congress,
therefore, enacted the Arbitration Act, which specifically authorized the
validity of arbitration agreements made in interstate contracts.
27
Under the Arbitration Act, a court will invalidate an arbitration provision
only when grounds exist at law or in equity that mandate a revocation of
the arbitration agreement. 28 The Arbitration Act authorizes a district court
with proper jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration clause when a party alleges
hold arbitration clauses unenforceable); H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 1-2
(American judicial hostility towards arbitration derived from centuries of English court prece-
dent).
24. See Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 F. 319, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (court
agreed with business attitude that law should allow arbitration but court felt constrained by
precedent to refuse specific performance of arbitration agreement until legislature changed law),
aff'd, 5 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1924); see also S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 1, 3 (1924)
(arbitration appealing to businesses because of arbitration's speed and decreased costs); Cohen
& Dayton, supra note 22, at 265 (business community supported arbitration for reasons of speed
and decreased costs).
25. See S. RaP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. at 3 (1924) (arbitration often requires one
hearing of only a few hours making arbitration less costly and less time consuming than
litigation); H.R. Rap. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1924) (parties to arbitration not
subject to litigational delays and expenses or to interference by court); see also Jones, Historical
Development of Commercial Arbitration in the United States, 12 MINN. L. REV. 240, 240 (1928)
(same). Arguably, the advantages of arbitration over litigation include the establishment of
trade customs and the substitution of the practical knowledge of businesspersons for more
inexperienced judicial knowledge. Jones, supra, at 240; see generally DomKE, supra note 3, §
1.01 at 1 (arbitration amounts to speedy inexpensive decision in contractual dispute resolution).
Courts have uniformly upheld the Arbitration Act in the face of due process challenges because
arbitration does not deny the right to a trial by a jury since a party can waive the right to a
jury trial. DOMKa, supra note 3, § 4.02 at 30. But see infra notes 71, 225-26 and accompanying
text (suggesting disadvantages of arbitration process).
26. See H.R. RaP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. at 1 (1924) (arbitration provisions are
contractual and Arbitration Act puts arbitration clauses on same level as other contractual
agreements); see also Cohen & Dayton, supra note 22, at 278 (only difference between arbitration
clause and other contractual provisions is that only adequate remedy for breach of arbitration
agreement is specific enforcement because awarding damages would not be compenstate party
for loss of speed that characterizes arbitration).
27. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (arbitration provision in maritime contract or contract
involving interstate commerce is valid and enforceable); see also Moses, 460 U.S. at 24
(Arbitration Act embodies congressional declaration of liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements).
28. 9 U.S.C. § 2; see infra notes 58-73 and accompanying text (discussing '33 Act as
federal law that precludes enforcement of arbitration agreements).
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the failure of another party to arbitrate.29 In addition, the Arbitration Act
enables a party to appeal an arbitrator's award if the party is dissatisfied
with the award.3 0 A court may reverse an arbitral award only on very limited
grounds." Consequently, the Arbitration Act represents a policy of granting
arbitration agreements the same status as other valid contract provisions by
using the power of the judiciary to specifically enforce arbitration agree-
ments .
32
The Arbitration Act's policy of according arbitration agreements the
same status as other judicially enforceable contractual agreements arguably
conflicts with the legislative history, statutory language, and policies embod-
ied in the '33 Act and the '34 Act.33 Congress enacted the '33 Act and the
'34 Act to prevent the disregard of fair and honest business practices and
the floating of fraudulent securities that contributed to the stock market
crash of 1929.14 Congress designed the federal securities laws to prevent
another devastating economic disaster.3" Initially, Congress enacted the '33
29. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982). A court of proper jurisdiction for the purposes of the Arbitration
Act is any federal district court that would have jurisdiction over the suit under sections of
Title 28 of the United States Code. Id. Furthermore, federal district courts must have jurisdiction
over the suit independent of section 4 of the Arbitration Act. See Metro Indus. Painting Corp.
v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 384 (2d Cir. 1961) (United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit finds that federal district court could hear case disputing an arbitration
agreement because defendant satisfied diversity of citizenship requirement), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 817 (1961); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) (federal district courts have jurisdiction over cases
involving diverse citizens). The use of a motion procedure when seeking enforcement of an
arbitration clause rather than a full court procedure reduces the time and expense to the parties.
9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982); see H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1924) (procedure for
seeking enforcement of arbitration agreement by simple motion procedure part of congressional
design to reduce delay, expense, and technicality).
30. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982).
31. Id. Under the Arbitration Act, Congress limited the grounds on which a court may
vacate an arbitrator's award. Id. The grounds include instances where the award was gained
through fraud or corruption, where the arbitrators were corrupt, where the arbitrators refused
to hear pertinent and material evidence, and where the arbitrators exceeded their powers. Id.
The rationale for limited court review is that the nature of arbitration is speedy resolution of
disputes and extensive court review of an arbitrator's decision would impede speedy dispute
resolution. DoMKE, supra note 3, § 34.00, at 475-76.
32. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text (demonstrating that Arbitration Act
represents placement of arbitration agreements on same basis for enforcement purposes as other
contractual agreements by allowing specific enforcement of arbitration clauses).
33. See infra notes 34-50 and accompanying text (discussing different policies of Arbitra-
tion Act and federal securities laws).
34. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2-3 (1934) (broker-dealers floated
worthless securities, ultimately contributing to stock market crash), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE SECuRITIEs ACT OF 1933 AND SEcuRrriEs EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 85].
35. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 10 (1934) (goal of '34 Act is to disseminate
information about corporations to public on continuing basis and, thus, to allow investors
opportunity to make informed investment decisions), reprinted in 5 LEoisLATrVa HISTORY OF
THE SECuRnms ACT OF 1933 AND SEcuRTIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as S. REP. No. 792]; H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note 34, at 3 (purpose of '33 Act is to achieve full
disclosure of all information in connection with issuance of new security so investor can make
accurate assessment of value of security).
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Act to assure full and accurate disclosure to potential investors of essential
information accompanying the issuance of a new security.-6 Section 12 of
the '33 Act forbids anyone from making fraudulent statements or omitting
statements of material facts in connection with the sale of a security.
a7
Furthermore, section 12 provides an aggrieved investor alleging securities
fraud with an express private right of action to sue in a federal or state
court of competent jurisdiction.38 If a petitioner sues in federal court, section
22 of the '33 Act provides the petitioner with a broad choice of venue and
the benefit of nationwide service of process.3 9 The special benefits that
Congress granted to an aggrieved investor suing under the '33 Act indicate
Congress' emphasis on providing judicial remedies if a broker fraudulently
misleads an investor.40
Unlike the '33 Act, the '34 Act does not provide explicitly a private right
of action for an investor suing under the anti-fraud provisions of the '34
Act .4 Federal courts, however, have established definitively that an implied
private right of action exists for section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims. 42 An
implied private right of action for section 10(b) claims is logical for several
reasons 3.4 Federal discovery of securities violations would be difficult without
a private right of action because federal authorities often detect companies
violating federal securities laws only through customer complaints. 44 Fur-
36. See H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note 34, at 3 (Congress determined that full disclosure
of information regarding issuance of new security was necessary for informed investor decision).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
38. Id.
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1982) (section 22 of '33 Act provides for broad venue choices
and nationwide service of process). A petitioner suing under the '33 Act may bring the suit in
the district where the broker is found, inhabits or transacts business, or where the offer or sale
occurred. Id. In addition, the '33 Act provides that a petitioner suing in federal court may
make service of process in any district in which the petitioner finds the defendant broker-dealer.
Id.
40. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing congressionally granted benefits
for aggrieved investors suing under '33 Act).
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982) (section 10(b) antifraud provisions of '34 Act); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1985) (Rule lOb-5); supra note 5 (discussing section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); infra
notes 43-46 and accompanying text (courts imply private right of action for petitioners suing
under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5).
42. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (courts have
recognized private right of action under section 10(b) of '34 Act for 35 years); Superintendent
of Ins. of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (United States
Supreme Court accepts without question that implied private right of action exists for claims
under section 10(b) of '34 Act).
43. See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (demonstrating that implied private right
of action for 10(b) claims is logical).
44. See S. REP. No. 792, supra note 35, at 12. The United States Senate's report on the
'34 Act noted that experience with state laws showed that criminal penalties alone were an
inadequate remedy for fraudulent securities conduct. Id. Apparently, customers did not like to
become involved with lengthy criminal procedures. Id. The Senate reasoned that without
customer complaints discovery of securities violations by enforcement agencies would prove
difficult. Id. The Senate, therefore, endorsed implicitly a private right of action for claims
1986]
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thermore, congressional enactment of the '34 Act supplemented the '33 Act
by regulating the sale and purchase of securities and requiring continuous
disclosure of pertinent information by registered corporations.4 5 Congress'
enactment of the '34 Act reemphasized an intent embodied in the '33 Act of
lifting the shroud of mystery surrounding corporate practices by requiring
disclosure of all information necessary to an investor's decision regarding
the purchase of a security.4 The supplementary nature of the '34 Act implies
that the '34 Act did not abolish or alter the private right of action provided
by the '33 Act.4 7 Finally, in enacting the '34 Act, Congress endorsed a policy
that equity demands that an injured investor recover judicially imposed
damages because the judiciary will protect the rights of the investor. 4
Congress, therefore, endorsed judicial remedies for aggrieved investors alleg-
ing fraudulent practices in connection with a security transaction explicitly,
in the '33 Act, and implicitly, in the '34 Act.
4 9
By contrast, the federal policy embodied in the Arbitration Act favoring
court enforcement of arbitration agreements for prompt and economic
dispute resolution conflicts directly with the policy of the federal securities
laws advocating the use of a judicial forum for the protection of investors.5 0
In Wilko v. Swan," the United States Supreme Court examined the policy
conflict between the '33 Act and the Arbitration Act.12 In Wilko, the plaintiff
brought an action in the United States District Court for the Southern
under section 10(b) of the '34 Act. See id. at 12-13 (Senate notes importance of allowing judicial
remedies for harmed investors); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983)
(courts have recognized private right of action under section 10(b) of '34 Act for 35 years).
45. See Note, supra note 21, at 533 ('34 Act is extension of '33 Act and requires
continuous disclosure of information by corporation with registered securities); Axelrod & Co.
v. Kordich, Victor & Neufeld, 451 F.2d 838, 843 (2d Cir. 1971) ('33 Act and '34 Act are in
pari materia and courts should construe them as one); infra note 191 and accompanying text
(defining in pari materia); infra notes 208-212 and accompanying text (suggesting that '33 and
'34 Acts are in pari materia).
46. See H.R. REp. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 11 (1934) (secrecy often results in
manipulative practices in connection with transactions involving securities), reprinted in 5
LEoistATrvE HisToRY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITrrIES ExCHANGE ACT OF 1934
(1973) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1383].
47. See infra notes 209-14 and accompanying text (demonstrating that implied private
right of action for claims under section 10(b) of '34 Act is proper).
48. See S. REP. No. 792, supra note 34, at 12 (equity demands that court award investor
damages if investor suffered injury in connection with security transactions).
49. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (discussing congressional endorsement
of judicial remedies for violations of federal securities laws).
50. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (United States Supreme Court acknowl-
edges different policies behind Arbitration Act and '33 Act that are not easily reconcilable);
Neville, The Enforcement of Arbitration Clauses in Investor-Broker Agreements, 34 ARB. J. 5,
6 (March 1979) (conflict exists between Arbitration Act's validation of arbitration agreements
and federal securities acts' presumption that investor needs judicial protection); supra notes 32-
49 and accompanying text (discussing policies behind Arbitration Act and federal securities
laws).
51. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
52. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 430-38 (1953).
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District of New York alleging that the defendant brokerage house induced
the plaintiff to purchase stock by using false representations and omissions
of information in violation of section 12(2) of the '33 Act. 3 The defendant
brokerage firm moved to stay the judicial action pending arbitration in
accordance with the terms of the broker-investor contract.14 The district
court denied enforcement of the arbitration clause, holding that the arbitra-
tion agreement denied the petitioner the advantage of the judicial remedy
provided by the '33 Act.,, The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed the district court and decided that the '33 Act did
not prohibit the use of predispute agreements. 6 The United States Supreme
Court in Wilko granted certiorari to determine whether the statutory language
and policies behind the '33 Act mandated that a court refuse enforcement
of arbitration agreements in the context of claims arising under section 12
of the '33 Act. 7
The Supreme Court in Wilko relied on section 14 of the '33 Act to
determine whether the Court should enforce the agreement." Section 14
provides that any stipulation compelling a purchaser of a security to waive
compliance with any provision of the '33 Act is void., 9 The Supreme Court,
to reconcile the different policies of the '33 Act and the Arbitration Act,
reviewed the impetus and congressional intent for the '33 Act. 60 The Court
found that section 12(2) created a special right to sue in a state court or
federal court of competent jurisdiction when the petitioner alleges that a
broker-dealer made fraudulent statements. 61 Furthermore, the Court noted
that section 12(2) fraud was different from common law fraud because the
seller assumes the burden of proving the lack of scienter. 62 Moreover, the
53. Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir.),
rev'd, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); see 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982) (section 12 of '33 Act).
54. Wilko. 107 F. Supp, at 76-77 (setting forth arbitration provisions of investor contract
in Wilko).
55. Id. at 77-78.
56. Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir. 1953).
57. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 427; see infra notes 58-73 and accompanying text (discussing
Supreme Court's reasoning in Wilko).
58. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-37; see 15 U.S.C, § 77n (1982) (section 14 of '33 Act).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982) (section 14 of '33 Act is nonwaiver provision).
60. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430-31; see supra notes 35-49 and accompanying text (discussing
congressional intent when enacting '33 and '34 Acts).
61. Wilko, 346 US. at 431; see 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982) (section 12 of '33 Act provides
that investor alleging misrepresentation by broker-dealer may sue in state or federal court of
competent jurisdiction).
62. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431; see 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982) (investor alleging misrepresentation
has choice of suing in state or federal court of competent jurisdiction). A general definition of
scienter is the intent to mislead, to deceive, or to create a false impression. BROMBERGO, 3
SEcuarrms FRAurD & FRAUD 203 (1970). Under section 12(2) of the '33 Act an investor is
entitled to relief for negligent as well as intentional conduct. BROMBERG, supra, at 203; see H.R.
REp. No. 85, supra note 34, at 9. Congress believed that placing the burden of proof on the
broker-dealer concerning the issue of knowledge of any misstatements was indispensible to
making buyer remedies under section 12 of the '33 Act practical. H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note
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Supreme Court emphasized that Congress provided to plaintiffs bringing
section 12(2) suits the benefits of broad choices of venue and nationwide
service of process not necessarily available under arbitration or other types
of statutory claims. 63 The Supreme Court held that the nonwaiver provisions
of section 14 prohibited parties to a securities contract from utilizing an
arbitration agreement to relinquish the investor's special rights in section
12(2) to a judicial proceeding.64
In addition, the Supreme Court found that Congress placed the securities
investor on a basis different from other purchasers. 65 The Court noted that
Congress acknowledged the special nature of the average uninformed inves-
tor, as compared with the superior position of knowledge occupied by the
broker-dealer, by requiring the disclosure of material information." The
Supreme Court found that Congress created for the securities investor
broader choices of courts and venue not afforded the ordinary petitioner as
further recognition of the special nature of a securities investor. 67 The Court
34, at 9. Congress reasoned that the purchaser would carry too great a burden if Congress
required that the buyer of securities prove a state of knowledge on the part of the broker-
dealer. Id.; see also Kranse, Securities Litigation: The Unsolved Problem of Predispute Arbi-
tration Agreements for Pendent Claims, 29 DEPAuI. L. Rav. 693, 702 (1980) (section 12(a) of
'33 Act provides investor with special rights more protective than rights at common law because
broker assumes burden of proving lack of scienter); Note, Enforceability of Arbitration
Agreements in Fraud Actions Under the Securities Act, 62 YALE L. J. 985, 985-86 (1953) (claims
under Securities Act are unlike claims of common law fraud because under the '33 Act
misrepresentation does not need to be factor that induces purchaser to buy).
63. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431; 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1982) (section 22 of '33 Act provides wide
venue provisions and nationwide service of process); see Atlanta Shipping Corp. v. Cheswick-
Flanders & Co., 463 F. Supp. 614, 619 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). When parties agree to arbitrate in
New York and file motion for enforcement of the arbitration agreement in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, a presumption arises that the parties
consented to venue in the district court. Atlanta Shipping Corp. v. Cheswick-Flanders & Co.,
463 F. Supp. at 619 n.5. Parties, however, probably would utilize the predispute arbitration
agreement to require an arbitral forum with greater speed and efficiency than a federal district
court. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (arbitration provides speed and efficiency
lacking in judicial tribunal); supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of
section 22 of '33 Act).
64. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435 (right to select judicial forum cannot be waived under
section 14 of '33 Act); 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982) (section 14 of '33 Act voids any stipulation that
waives any rights found in '33 Act); supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing provisions
of section 14 of '33 Act).
65. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435 (Congress specifically provided securities investor with
special rights to protect the investor); see also H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 46, at 11
(Congress determined that securities investor is at disadvantage in securities transaction if
investor lacks adequate information).
66. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435 (securities investor has special need for protection); supra
note 35 and accompanying text (Congress enacted '33 Act keeping in mind investor's uninformed
nature); see also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (main goal of federal securities
laws is protection of investors through full disclosure of information by issuer of securities);
H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 46, at 11 (no investor, sophisticated or otherwise, can safely
buy or sell securities without having basis of knowledge for deciding securities' value).
67. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435 (Congress created in '33 Act special rights of venue and
service of process for securities investors); supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing
special rights of broader venue and nationwide service of process embodied in '33 Act).
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held that an arbitration agreement would force an investor to surrender the
special litigational rights that Congress provided the securities investor.
68
The Supreme Court, furthermore, stated that surrender of the special
litigational rights in favor of arbitration subjected the parties to the disad-
vantages of arbitration. 69 The Wilko Court noted that the disadvantages of
arbitration included a lack of judicial instruction on the law, a lack of a
complete record and opinion, and narrow grounds for a court vacating an
arbitration award.7 0 The Supreme Court admitted that the arbitrator's failure
to apply properly the '33 Act would constitute grounds for overturning an
arbitrator's award. 7 ' The Court, however, stated that the arbitrator's failure
to apply properly the '33 Act would need to appear clearly before a court
could vacate the arbitrator's award.7 2 The Supreme Court ultimately held
that, because judicial direction was necessary to ensure investor protection
under the '33 Act, parties could not purport to waive the investor's right to
a judicial forum before a controversy arises.
73
Following the Wilko decision, federal courts did not receive more
guidance from the United States Supreme Court on the issue of the arbitra-
bility of claims under the federal securities laws until 1973, when the Supreme
Court decided the case of Scherk v. Albert-Culver Company.74 The Scherk
Court ordered the specific enforcement of an arbitration agreement for
claims arising under the '34 Act. 75 In Scherk, the plaintiff, an American
corporation engaged in manufacturing and distributing toiletries and hair
products, purchased from the defendant, a German citizen, the ownership
68. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 437-38 (holding that investor cannot waive special right to
judicial forum in '33 Act suits).
69. Id.; see infra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing attributes of arbitration that
United States Supreme Court found to be disadvantageous to investor).
70. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435-37. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S.
198, 203 (1955) (detailing disadvantages of arbitration that distinguish arbitration from judicial
proceeding). The Supreme Court in Bernhardt noted that the law does not require that arbitrators
give opinions. Id. The Bernhardt Court also noted that arbitration does not include jury trials
which may effect the ultimate outcome. Id. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Bernhardt
stated that arbitrators do not have the benefit of judicial instruction on the law. Id. Finally,
the Bernhardt Court stated that the forum in which a party brings his claims becomes an
important part of the rights supporting the plaintiff's cause of action. Id.; DOMKE, supra note
3, § 27.01, at 411 (arbitration proceedings not subject to broad discovery rules and fair
procedures embodied in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); supra note 31 and accompanying
text (explaining limited manner in which courts may reverse arbitral award).
71. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436; see supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing
Arbitration Act's limitations of grounds upon which courts may vacate arbitrator's decision).
72. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436; see also 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982) (listing narrow grounds on
which reviewing court can vacate arbitrator's decision); supra note 31 (specifying grounds upon
which court may vacate arbitrator's award).
73. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 437-38.
74. 417 U.S. 506 (1974); see infra notes 75-101 and accompanying text (discussing Scherk's
facts and Supreme Court's holding).
75. Scherk v. Albert-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20; see infra note 160 (listing federal
courts that have applied Wilko to claims of fraudulent broker-dealer activity in violation of '34
Act).
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of the defendant's businesses that were engaged in the manufacture of
toiletries and the licensing of trademarks for the toiletries.7 6 Defendant's
businesses were organized under the laws of Germany and Liechtenstein, and
negotiations for the purchase of the defendant's businesses took place in
Germany and Austria.77 The contract provided that, in the event of a dispute,
the parties would submit the controversy to arbitration before the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce in Paris, France and the laws of Illinois would
control the arbitrator's decision.7 8 The plaintiff brought suit in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois upon discovery of
encumbrances on the trademarks that the plaintiff purchased in the trans-
action. 79 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant fraudulently misrepresented
the status of the trademarks in violation of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 of
the '34 Act.80 Defendant moved for arbitration in accordance with the
arbitration agreement. 8 ' The district court, relying on Wilko, did not order
arbitration.8 2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court. 83 The United States Supreme Court, however,
reversed the Seventh Circuit and ordered arbitration of the claims under
section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 of the '34 Act. 84
In Scherk, the Supreme Court stated initially that Wilko arguably did
not apply to a claim under section 10(b) of the '34 Act.8 5 The Court explained
that the '34 Act did not possess a counterpart to section 12(2) of the '33
Act.8 6 The Supreme Court admitted that section 10(b) of the '34 Act
addressed fraudulent practices in the same manner as section 12(2) of the
'33 ActY The Scherk Court, however, stated that section 12(2) of the '33
Act provides an express private right of action while section 10(b) of the '34
Act does not create an express private right of action.8 The Supreme Court
noted that only federal case law has established a private cause of action for
section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 claims.8 9 The Scherk Court acknowledged the
Wilko Court's holding that the private right of action in the '33 Act was not
76. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 508-09.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 508-09, n.I.
79. Id. at 509.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 510.
83. Albert-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 1973).
84. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520-21.
85. Id. at 513-14.
86. Id. at 513; see 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982) (fraud provision of '33 Act); supra notes 37-
38 and accompanying text (explaining contents of section 12(2) of '33 Act); infra notes 87-93
and accompanying text (discussing Scherk Court's statement that Wilko holding arguably did
not apply to section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 claims under '33 Act).
87. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 514.
88. Scherk, 417 U.S. 513-14; 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) (section 10(b)); see supra note 5
(explaining section 10(b) of '34 Act).
89. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513-14; see supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (discussing
rationale for implying private cause of action under section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 of '34 Act).
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subject to waiver. 90 The Scherk Court, however, suggested that the '34 Act
might not possess the special right of judicial remedy that the Wilko Court
found so significant because Congress did not create the special right to
judicial remedy in section 10(b) of the '34 Act that Congress had included
in section 12(2) of the '33 Act. 91 The Supreme Court also explained that the
'34 Act did not provide the wide forum choices that exist in section 22 of
the '33 Act.92 The Court noted that under the '34 Act a petitioner may sue
only in federal district courts that have exclusive jurisdiction over suits
arising under the '34 Act. 93
Although the Scherk Court discussed the differences between the '33 and
'34 Acts, the Court premised the Court's decision to permit arbitration on
the differences between the type of contract in Wilko and the contract found
in Scherk.94 The Court did not disallow specifically judicial enforcement of
predispute arbitration agreements in the context of section 10(b) of the '34
Act. 95 The Supreme Court, however,noted that the contract between the
plaintiff and defendant in Scherk embodied an international agreement in
which the parties signed the contract in Austria, closed the deal in Switzerland
and negotiated in the United States, England and Gernany.96 Furthermore,
the transaction involved entities conducting business exclusively in Europe. 97
Consequently, doubt existed concerning which country's laws would apply
in the event of a dispute between the parties.98
In contrast, the contract in Wilko possessed a purely domestic char-
acter and the federal securities laws were controlling in the event of a
controversy between the parties.99 The Supreme Court noted that, in the
case of an international contract, choice of forum clauses and choice of
law clauses were necessary to avoid comity problems between the judi-
cial systems of different countries.200 Consequently, the Supreme Court
90. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 514.
91. Id. at 514.
92. Id.; see supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing wide forum choices and
nationwide service of process available to investors suing under '33 Act).
93. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 514; 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982).
94. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515-18; see infra note 100 and accompanying text (explaining
unique nature of international contracts that necessitates use of arbitration clause).
95. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519-20.
96. Id. at 508-09.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 516-17.
99. Id. at 515.
100. Id. at 516. The Supreme Court in Scherk posited a situation in which one party tried
to gain a tactical advantage by securing a foreign court's order enjoining the other party from
proceeding in an American court. Id. at 516-17. The Supreme Court questioned the deference
that an American court would give the foreign order. Id. at 517. According to the Scherk
Court, the resulting doubt of which forum would resolve disputes would damage international
commerce. Id. The Court opined that the possibility that one party to an international contract
might preclude another party from proceeding in an American court made unrealistic a party's
expectations of the advantages embodied in the federal securities laws. Id. at 517-18.
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enforced the arbitration clause as a necessary attribute of international
business.'10
Following Scherk, the United States Supreme Court did not consider the is-
sue of judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements in broker-investor con-
tracts until 1985 in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd.2 In Byrd, the plaintiff
investor brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of California against the defendant brokerage firm, alleging violations of
provisions of the '34 Act and various state laws.'03 The defendant moved for ar-
bitration of the state law claims and a stay of the federal securities law claims
pending resolution in arbitration of the pendent state laws claims.' 4 The
defendant did not move for arbitration of the federal claims because the defen-
dant assumed that the federal law claims were not arbitrable. 0 5 The Supreme
Court expressly declined to decide whether courts could enforce agreements to
arbitrate claims arising under the '34 Act because the issue of the applicability
of Wilko to claims under the '34 Act was not properly before the Court."I
In Byrd, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the Arbitration Act
required federal district courts to compel arbitration of pendent state law
claims when a party requests arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agree-
ment.' 07 The Byrd Court further stated that section 2 of the Arbitration Act
did not allow federal district courts to exercise discretion in deciding whether
to order arbitration of arbitrable claims under a predispute arbitration
agreement. 08 The Supreme Court held that Congress intended to place
arbitration agreements on an equal basis with other contractual agreements
and to allow judicial enforcement of private agreements.' °9
101. Id. at 519-20.
102. 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985); see infra notes 103-13 and accompanying text (discussing
Supreme Court's holding in Byrd).
103. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 1239 (1985). The plaintiff in
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd alleged that defendant brokerage house violated sections
10(b), 15(c) and 20 of the '34 Act, as well as state law claims. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1982) ('34 Act's general antifraud provision applicable to all persons); 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)
(1982) ('34 Act forbidding broker fraud); 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1982) (provision in '34 Act placing
liability on persons violating provisions of '34 Act). The federal court in Byrd had jurisdiction
over the state claims based on diversity of citizenship and the principles of pendent jurisdiction.
See Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1239 (federal jurisdiction predicated on pendent jurisdiction and diversity
of citizenship). See generally Note, The Severability of Arbitrable and Nonarbitrable Claims,
41 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1165, 1167 (1985). Federal securities laws do not afford investors the
possibility of recovering punitive damages. Id. Parties seeking punitive damages, therefore,
often join state claims with federal securities claims because the possibility exists under state
law that a court will grant punitive damages to the investor. Id. at 1167-68.
104. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1239.
105. Id. at 1239-40; see infra notes 160-167 and accompanying text (discussing overall
trend among federal courts to apply Wilko to claims arising under '34 Act).
106. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1240 n.l.
107. Id. at 1241-43.
108. Id. at 1241; see supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of
Arbitration Act).
109. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1242; see supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (congressional
goal with passage of Arbitration Act was to allow arbitration agreements same degree of
enforceability as other contract clauses).
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Furthermore, the Byrd Court stated that compelling arbitration of state
claims and ordering adjudication of claims under the federal securities laws
would result in bifurcated proceedings with an arbital forum deciding the
state securities claims and a judicial forum deciding the federal securities
claims." '0 The Supreme Court acknowledged that the bifurcated proceedings
would revolve around similar facts and might result in the sacrificing of
speed and efficiency."' The Court, however, found that the Arbitration Act
required judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements even if the decision
would result in piecemeal issue resolution. ' 2 The Supreme Court, therefore,
ordered arbitration of the arbitrable pendant state claims." 3
While agreeing with the Court's opinion that the issue of the applicability
of Wilko to the '34 Act was not properly before the Supreme Court, Justice
White's concurrence strongly recommended that courts should not apply
Wilko automatically to bar arbitration of claims under the '34 Act. ' 4 The
Justice elaborated on the Supreme Court's earlier statement in Scherk that
the rationale in Wilko might not apply to the '34 Act because of the statutory
110. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1241-43.
111. Id. at 1241.
112. Id. at 1242-43.
113. Id. at 1244. The Supreme Court in Byrd considered whether the decision of the
arbitrator on the state claims would have a preclusive effect on a court subsequently hearing
the claims under the federal securities laws. Id. at 1243-44. Initially, the Court stated that the
federal interests embodied in the federal securities laws would be protected by the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. Id. at 1243. In addition, the Byrd Court noted that arbitration decisions do
not necessarily have a preclusive effect on subsequent federal court proceedings. Id. at 1243;
see DomKE, supra note 3, § 39.04, at 510. While the preclusive effect of an arbitration agreement
over a federal court hearing the federal securities law claims is not clear, the rule is established
that a judgment rendered upon an appeal from an award does have preclusive effect on
subsequent suits or arbitration arising out of the same cause of action or same dispute. DOMKE,
supra note 3, § 39.04, at 510. Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that the federal full faith
and credit clause requires only that federal courts give the same preclusive effect to state judicial
proceedings as would the courts of the state rendering judgment. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1243; see
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982) (federal full faith and credit clause) (federal courts must give same
preclusive effect to a state court judgment as would courts of the state rendering judgment).
The Supreme Court stated that an arbitration proceeding was not a judicial proceeding within
the federal full faith and credit clause. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1243. The Supreme Court declined
to decide what preclusive effect, if any, an arbitrator's decision would have on a federal court
proceeding. Id. at 1244. The Supreme Court in Byrd did not decide the issue of the preclusive
effect of an arbitration decision because the collateral estoppel issue would arise after the parties
completed the arbitration proceedings. Id. In Byrd no arbitration had taken place. Id. The
Supreme Court, therefore, declined to decide the issue of collateral estoppel. Id. Instead, the
Byrd Court left the collateral estoppel issue to lower courts, cautioning courts framing collateral
estoppel rules to take into account the federal interests of protecting the investor. Byrd, 105 S.
Ct. at 1244; see McDonald v. City of West Branch Mich., 466 U.S. 284, 291-92 (1984) (holding
that arbitration is not judicial proceeding and full faith and credit clause is not binding on
courts considering an issue subsequent to arbitration of same issue).
114. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1244 (White, J., concurring); see supra note 106 and accompanying
text (explaining why Supreme Court in Byrd did not consider issue of applicability of Wilko to
'34 Act).
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language and the congressional intent of the '33 and '34 Acts."' Initially,
Justice White noted that, while the '33 Act and the '34 Act contain equivalent
antiwaiver provisions," 6 the '34 Act lacks the special rights embodied in the
'33 Act that the Wilko Court found significant.1 7 Specifically, Justice White
stated that the '34 Act has a more narrow jurisdictional grant than the '33
Act."8 White stated correctly that only federal courts can hear cases brought
under the '34 Act, while federal and state courts can hear cases brought
under the '33 Act." 9 Justice White then mentioned that section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 of the '34 Act do not have an express private cause of action
and have only a judicially implied private right of action.12' Justice White
noted that the judicially implied right of action contrasted with section 12(2)
of the '33 Act, which expressly provided a private right of action.' 2' The
Justice stated that the Wilko Court found the express right to sue in federal
court, embodied in the '33 Act, so significant that a party could not waive
the party's right to bring a claim under the '33 Act in a judicial forum.
2 2
In comparison, Justice White suggested that the implied private right of
action for section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims did not amount to a congres-
sionally created special right that a party cannot waive. 123 Furthermore,
Justice White stated that the '34 Act's nonwaiver provision precluded waiver
115. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1244 (White, J., concurring); see Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513 (Supreme
Court questions for first time applicability of Wilko to claims under '34 Act); supra notes 85-
93 and accompanying text (discussing Scherk Court's questioning whether Wilko applied to
claims under '34 Act); infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text (discussing Justice White's
analysis of differences between '33 and '34 Acts that suggests Wilko might be inapplicable to
'34 Act).
116. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982) (section 14's nonwaiver provision of '33 Act) with
15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (section 29's nonwaiver provision of '34 Act).
117. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1244 (White, J., concurring); see infra notes 118-25 and accom-
panying text (discussing special rights in '33 Act that '34 Act lacks).
118. See Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1244 (White, J., concurring) (noting that '34 Act has narrower
jurisdictional grant than '33 Act); infra note 119 and accompanying text (demonstrating that
jurisdictional grants in '33 Act are different from '34 Act).
119. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1244 (White, J., concurring). Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982)
(under '34 Act federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction) with 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1982)
(under '33 Act federal district courts have concurrent jurisdiction with state courts). Under the
'33 Act, plaintiffs have the benefit of nationwide service of process and wide venue choices. 15
U.S.C. § 77v (1982). Parties to a '33 Act action, however, cannot remove to federal court a
proceeding brought in state curt. Id.; see supra notes 38-49 and accompanying text (discussing
provisions for judicial proceedings under '33 and '34 Acts).
120. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1244 (White, J., concurring); see supra notes 44-48 and accom-
panying text (discussing implied private right of action for claims arising under section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 of '34 Act).
121. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1244 (White, J., concurring); 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982) (section
12 of '33 Act); see supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing importance of affording
injured investor opportunity for redress and recovery of damages).
122. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1244 (White, J., concurring); see Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35
(Congress created in '33 Act special right to sue in judicial forum for damages resulting from
broker-dealer's fraudulent acts).
123. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1244 (White, J., concurring).
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of any provision of the '34 Act.'24 The Justice suggested that because an
implied private right of action is not part of the actual provisions of the '34
Act, the nonwaiver provision of the '34 Act did not prevent a party's waiver
of a private right of action.12' Ultimately, Justice White's concurrence
intimated that courts might order enforcement of predispute arbitration
agreements in the context of the '34 Act.
26
Justice White's concurrence in Byrd did not discuss whether the enforce-
ability of arbitration agreements in the context of claims under the '34 Act
accords with the Supreme Court's clear intent of enforcing arbitration
agreements unless grounds exist at law or equity that require a court not to
enforce an arbitration agreement. 27 Justice White's rationale, however,
coincides with a recent Supreme Court trend enforcing predispute arbitration
agreements. 2 8 The recent United States Supreme Court case of Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 12 9 summarizes and advances
the Supreme Court's endorsement of the enforceability of predispute arbitra-
tion agreements.'- In Mitsubishi, the defendant, Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
entered into a Distributor Agreement with the plaintiffs, Chrysler Interna-
tional, S.A. and Mitsubishi Motors Corporation (Mitsubishi) that provided
for the sale by the defendant of Mitsubishi manufactured vehicles.' 3' The
124. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1982). The nonwaiver provision of the '34 Act provides
that a stipulation waiving compliance with any provision of the '34 Act is void. 15 U.S.C. §
78cc(a) (1982). A private right of action is not a provision of the '34 Act and arguably is
beyond the reach of the nonwaiver provision. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1244 (White, J., concurring).
125. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1244 (White, J., concurring).
126. See id. at 1244. Justice White's opinion suggested that the lower federal court opinions
holding that Wilko precludes enforcement of arbitration of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims
pursuant to predispute arbitration agreements must be viewed with some doubt. Id.; see also
Fitzgerald, Arbitration of lob-5 Claims, 18 THE Rvvmw oF SEcUiurns AND COMMODITIES
REGULATION 195, 199 n.30 (1985). Fitzgerald suggests that there is no statutory conflict between
the Arbitration Act and the '34 Act because courts imply a private right of action for claims
under 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 of the '34 Act. Fitzgerald, supra, at 199 n.30; see infra notes 194-
214 and accompanying text (discussing whether Justice White's analysis of '33 and '34 Act falls
within standards of statutory interpretation); infra notes 168-77 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing recent federal circuit courts and federal district courts use of White's analysis of '33
and '34 Acts to enforce predispute agreements in context of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims
under '34 Act).
127. See Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1244 (White, J., concurring) (failing to discuss whether judicial
enforcement of arbitration agreements in the context of claims under the '34 Act accords with
Supreme Court's intent of enforcing arbitration agreements unless grounds exist at law or equity
that require court not to enforce arbitration agreement); infra notes 130-58 and accompanying
text (discussing recent Supreme Court trend strongly endorsing judicial enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements); supra notes 114-26 and accompanying text (discussing Justice White's analysis
in the concurrence to Byrd of '33 and '34 Acts).
128. See infra notes 130-58 and accompanying text (discussing recent Supreme Court trend
strongly endorsing judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements).
129. 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
130. See infra notes 131-58 and accompanying text (discussing Mitsubishi case and manner
in which case represents strong evidence of enforceability of predispute arbitration agreements).
131. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3349
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parties also signed a Sales Agreement that referred to the Distributor
Agreement and provided for the direct sale of Mitsubishi products to the
defendant. 3 2 The Sales Agreement included an arbitration clause that re-
quired settlement by arbitration of all future controversies arising out of the
contract in Japan in accordance with the rules of the Japan Commercial
Arbitration Association.' 33 After initially brisk business, the defendant's sales
decreased and the defendant subsequently requested that the plaintiffs delay
or cancel several orders. 34 Soler also attempted to arrange for the transship-
ment for sale of a number of Soler's vehicles to the United States and Latin
America.a 5 Mitsubishi and CISA refused to grant Soler permission to arrange
for transshipment. 3 6 Mitsubishi eventually withheld shipment of a number
of vehicles, placing responsibility on Soler for Mitsubishi's lost revenue.
3 7
The plaintiffs sought to enforce the arbitration agreement by bringing
suit in the United States District Court of Puerto Rico. 38 The defendant
asserted a number of different counterclaims, including claims under the
federal antitrust laws.' 39 The district court ordered arbitration of all the
issues in the complaint and of most of the counterclaims. 140 The district
(discussing terms of distribution agreement). Mitsubishi Motors Corporation (Mitsubishi), a
Japanese corporation, is the product of a joint venture between Chrysler International, S.A.
(CISA), a Swiss corporation that Chrysler Corporation wholly owns, and Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries, Incorporated, a Japanese corporation. Id. The joint venture's aim was to use
Chrysler dealers outside of the United States to distribute, beyond the continental United States,
Mitsubishi manufactured vehicles bearing Chrysler and Mitsubishi trademarks. Id.
132. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3349.
133. See Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3349 (setting forth arbitration clause at issue in
Mitsubishi). The arbitration clause stated that arbitration in accordance with the rules of the




137. Id. at 3350.
138. Id.
139. Id. In Mitsubishi, the defendant's counterclaim alleged that the plaintiffs breached
the Sales Agreement, raised two defamation claims, and alleged violations of the Sherman Act,
the Federal Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act, the Puerto Rico competition statute, and
the Puerto Rico Dealers Contracts Act. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982) (Sherman Act); 15
U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1982) (Federal Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act); P.R. LAws ANN.,
tit. 10, §§ 257-276 (1976) (Puerto Rico competition statute); P.R. LAws ANN., tit. 10, § 278-
278d (1976) (Puerto Rico Dealers Contracts Act). The defendant's Sherman Act claim alleged
that the plaintiffs had conspired to divide markets in restraint of trade by refusing to allow the
defendant to sell to buyers in North, Central, and South America the vehicles the defendant
had agreed to purchase. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3351. Furthermore, the defendant contended
that the plaintiffs had violated the Sherman Act by attempting to replace the defendant with a
wholly owned subsidiary that would serve as the exclusive Mitsubishi distributor in Puerto Rico.
Id. Finally, the defendant alleged that the plaintiffs violated the Sherman Act by refusing to
ship ordered vehicles and parts that would have made the vehicles suitable for resale outside of
Puerto Rico. Id.
140. Id. at 3351. The district court in Mitsubishi did not order arbitration of two
counterclaims and a portion of a third counter claim. Id. Specifically, the district court found
that the arbitration clause did not encompass the claims for damages for defamation or the
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court, relying on Scherk, stated that arbitration clauses are a necessity to
international transactions.' 4 1 The United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit reversed the district court and held that the federal antitrust
issues were nonarbitrable and that Scherk did not require the abandonment
of the doctrine that federal antitrust issues were nonarbitrable in the face of
an international transaction. 142 The First Circuit, however, held that the
remainder of the issues were arbitrable.' 43 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide specifically if a court may enforce an agreement to
arbitrate antitrust claims when the agreement arises from an international
transaction. 144
The Supreme Court in Mitsubishi stated initially that the Arbitration
Act established a federal substantive law of arbitrability embodying a liberal
federal policy in favor of arbitration agreements.' 45 According to the Mit-
subishi Court, Congress' primary concern in the Arbitration Act was the
enforceability of private agreements. 46 The Supreme Court stated that, given
the congressional aim of the Arbitration Act, the Court ardently must enforce
arbitration agreements.' 47 The Supreme Court correctly noted that the Con-
gress' intention must guide the Court's interpretation of federal statutes.
48
Furthermore, the Court stated that the Court must resolve any doubts
concerning arbitrability in favor of arbitration.' 49 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, stated that courts cannot enforce an agreement to arbitrate a federal
statutory claim if Congress expressed an intention in that statute to prohibit
waiver of a judicial forum. 'O The Court stated that the Court derives
claims alleging discriminatory treatment and the establishment of minimum sales volumes. Id.
at 3351 n.7. The district court recognized that the federal courts of appeals uniformly had held
that rights under federal antitrust laws were not appropriate for enforcement by arbitration. Id.
at 3351. The district court, however, ordered arbitration stating that the transactions were of
an international character and that Scherk had established that in the context of international
agreements arbitration was a necessity. Id.; see American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire
& Co., 391 F.2d 821, 826-28 (2d Cir. 1968) (rights conferred by federal antitrust laws are
inappropriate for enforcement by arbitration).
141. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3351.
142. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d 155, 164-69 (Ist Cir. 1983).
143. Id.
144. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d 155 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 291 (1984), rev'd,
105 S Ct. 3346 (1985).
145. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3353 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); see supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text (discussing
rationale and provisions of Arbitration Act).
146. Id. at 3353-54 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 1243 (1985));
see supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (congressional motivation in passage of Arbitration
Act was to place arbitration agreements on same footing as other contractual agreements).
147. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3354.
148. See SUTHERLAND, 2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.05 (4th ed. 1984)
(rules of statutory construction mandate that courts construe statutes in accordance with
legislative intent).
149. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3354 (quoting Moses, 460 U.S. at 24-25).
150. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3355; see Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1244 (White, J., concurring)
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Congress' intention from the express language of the statute and the legis-
lative history of the statute."' The Mitsubishi Court established that in
determining whether a specific arbitration agreement is enforceable a court
first must determine whether the parties' agreement to arbitrate encompassed
the statutory issues. 52 Second, a court must examine whether the legal
constraints of statutory language, congressional intent and contrary federal
policy interests still preclude arbitration of the statutory issues." 3 The Su-
preme Court, however, found that the antitrust claims were arbitrable
pursuant to the arbitration clause based upon the reasoning expressed in
Scherk of the need for predictability in dispute resolution of international
contracts. 54 The Court, thereby, acknowledged that the private cause of
action plays a crucial role in assuring the adequacy of the antitrust laws in
protecting American democratic capitalism.' The Supreme Court, however,
stated that the importance of the private damages remedy does not mean
that a petitioner cannot seek damages beyond an American court.' 56 The
Mitsubishi opinion reinforces the doctrine that arbitration agreements arising
from international transactions are enforceable. 57 The Supreme Court's
holding in Mitsubishi also stands for the proposition that courts must enforce
arbitration agreements unless the statutory language or legislative history of
a federal statute evinces that Congress intended to prohibit arbitration of
rights guaranteed in the federal statute.""~
(Justice White suggests that Congress did not create in '34 Act special right to judicial forum
and enforcement of arbitration agreements in the context of '34 Act, therefore, might be
appropriate); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1983) (holding that Arbitration Act
prohibits state legislative attempts to preclude arbitration and only Congress may create federal
law that prohibits enforcement of arbitration agreement); Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35 ('33 Act
expressly precludes party's waiver of right to judicial forum).
151. Mitsubishi, 105 U.S. at 3355.
152. Id.; see supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing factors that court examines
in determining whether parties intended to arbitrate particular claim).
153. Mitsubishi, 105 U.S. at 3355.
154. Id. The Supreme Court in Mitsubishi warned that American courts had to suppress
domestic concepts of arbitrability to the international policy favoring arbitration. Id. at 3360.
The Supreme Court specifically refused to determine whether arbitration agreements in the con-
text of antitrust claims arising out of domestic transactions were judicially enforceable. Id. But
see American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827-28 (2d Cir. 1968)
(nature of antitrust laws and public interest in enforcement of antitrust laws mandate judicial
enforcement of law instead of arbitrai enforcement); Helfenbein v. International Indus., Inc.,
438 F.2d 1068, 1070 (7th Cir. 1971) (same), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971). See generally,
DomKE, supra note 3, § 19.04 at 289 (generally courts have held that, as matter of policy, anti-
trust disputes are not arbitrable).
155. Mitsubishi, 105 U.S. at 3358.
156. Id. at 3358-39.
157. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing special nature of international
transactions that demand enforcement of arbitration agreements in the context of federal
securities claims).
158. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text (Congress must evince intent in federal
statute to preclude arbitration of issues).
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In the context of the Supreme Court's general enforcement of arbitration
agreements, federal courts have considered the issue of the arbitrability of
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims on a number of occasions since the Supreme
Court's first consideration of that issue in Wilko. 5 9 Following the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Wilko that claims under the '33 Act are
not arbitrable pursuant to a predispute agreement, lower federal courts have
applied the Wilko Court's reasoning to invalidate predispute arbitration
agreements in the context of claims under the '34 Act.160 Several lower federal
courts assumed merely that Wilko's rationale applied automatically to claims
under the '34 Act.' 6' The courts that discussed the application of Wilko to
the '34 Act stated that the policy considerations supporting the '33 and '34
Acts are the same. 62 Those courts, therefore, reasoned that courts should
invalidate predispute arbitration agreements in cases involving the '33 Act,
as well as the '34 Act.' 63 These federal courts essentially have held that courts
159. See infra notes 160-83 and accompanying text (listing and discussing numerous
occasions on which federal district courts have considered judicial enforcement of predispute
arbitration agreements in context of section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 claims under '34 Act).
160. See, e.g., Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59, 61 (8th
Cir. 1984) (arbitration agreements are invalid in context of claims under '33 Act and '34 Act);
Kershaw v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 734 F.2d 1327, 1328 (9th Cir. 1984) (same); Mansbach
v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1030 (6th Cir. 1979) (same) vacated as moot,
Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc., v. Bd. of Trade, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 827-29 (10th Cir. 1978) (same); Weissbuch v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 835-36 (7th Cir. 1977) (same);
Sibley v. Tandy, 543 F.2d 540, 543 n.3 (5th Cir. 1976) (same), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824
(1977); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532, 536-37 (3d Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976); Axelrod v. Kordich, Victor & Neufeld, 451 F.2d
838, 843 (2d Cir. 1971) (same); Newman v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., Inc., 383 F. Supp. 265,
267-68 (W.D. Tex. 1974) (same); Macchiavelli v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., Inc., 384 F. Supp.
21, 27-28 (E.D. Cal. 1974) (same); Reader v. Hirsch & Co., 197 F. Supp. 111, 115-17 (S.D.N.Y.
1961) (same).
161. See, e.g., Surman v. Merrill Lynch, 733 F.2d at 61 (lower courts consistently hold
that Wilko applies to claims under '34 Act); Kershaw v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 734 F.2d
at 1328 (Ninth Circuit proceeds on assumption that Wilko applies to claims under '34 Act);
Macchiavelli v. Shearson, 384 F. Supp. at 27 (Wilko clearly decided issue that court cannot en-
force predispute arbitration agreements to claims under '34 Act).
162. See Merrill Lynch v. Moore, 590 F.2d at 827-28 (policy considerations of federal
securities acts are the same and Wilko applies to claims under '33 and '34 Acts). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Merrill Lynch v. Moore found that the purpose
of Rule lOb-5 and section 10(b) of the '34 Act was the protection of innocent investors from
more sophisticated broker-dealers. Id. The Moore court stated that section 12(2) of the '33 Act
possessed the same goal of investor protection. Id. The Tenth Circuit, therefore, reasoned that
the Wilko decision aimed at assuring aggrieved investors of all the investors' rights under the
'33 Act applied to the '34 Act. Id. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit refused to enforce a
predispute agreement to arbitrate section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims Id.; see also Sibley v.
Tandy, 543 F.2d at 543 n.3 (similarities between '33 Act and '34 Act outweigh any differences
and Wilko applies to claims under '33 Act and '34 Act); Axelrod v. Kordich, 451 F.2d at 843
(federal securities acts are in pari materia and courts should construe them together); infra notes
208-14 and accompanying text (proposing that courts should construe '33 Act and '34 Act
together because Acts are in pari materia).
163. See supra note 160 (listing cases discussing rationale for applying Wilko to '34 Act);
infra note 178 (same).
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should construe the '33 Act and '34 Act together as the embodiment of a
federal policy seeking to assure the protection of the securities investor solely
through the use of the judiciary.'1
Federal courts traditionally have refused to enforce predispute arbitration
agreements in the context of both the '33 and '34 Acts despite the Supreme
Court's enforcement in Scherk of an arbitration clause in the context of the
'34 Act. 65 The federal courts have given the Scherk Court's holding a narrow
construction and have applied the Scherk opinion only to international
contracts containing arbitration clauses.'1 The enforcement of arbitration
agreements in the context of international contracts provides certainty to
international transactions by disposing, in advance of any controversy, any
confusing problems that are characteristic of the conflict of laws doctrine . 6
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's holding in Byrd one federal circuit
court and a number of federal district courts have broken with tradition and
have enforced arbitration clauses in domestic contracts of claims under the
'34 Act.' 6s For example, the Eighth Circuit granted arbitration of section
164. See Note, supra note 21, at 536 ('33 Act and '34 Act have similar nonwaiver
provisions); Krause, supra note 62, at 704 (Krause's opinion that courts will hold claims under
'33 Act and '34 Act to be nonarbitrable); Comment, Arbitration of Investor-Broker Disputes,
65 CALIF. L. REV. 120, 120 (1977) (prohibition of waiver of causes of action under federal
securities law whether express or implied is consistent with federal securities laws' goal of
protecting investors).
165. See, e.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, 598 F.2d at 1030 (Scherk carved out narrow exception
to Wilko in context of international contracts); Merrill Lynch v. Moore, 590 F.2d at 828 (Tenth
Circuit notes uniform trend in post Scherk cases to distinguish Scherk based on its facts);
Weissbach v. Merrill Lynch, 558 F.2d at 834 (Scherk controlling only for significantly interna-
tional contracts); Sibley v. Tandy, 543 F.2d at 543 n.3 (although Scherk questioned applicability
of Wilko to '34 Act, Fifth Circuit held that Wilko applied to both '33 Act and '34 Act);
Newman v. Shearson, 383 F. Supp. at 268 (Scherk applies only to international contracts);
supra notes 145-58 and accompanying text (Mitsubishi opinion continues Supreme Court's
practice of placing international contracts in special category that demands enforcement of
predispute arbitration agreements).
166. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing lower courts' interpretation of
Scherk as providing narrow exception to Wilko rule).
167. See Note, Extraterritorial Application of United States Securities Law Denied: Arbi-
tration Clause in Investment Contract Enforced, 16 HARv. INT'L. L.J. 705, 715 (arbitration
agreements may be indispensable for stability in international business because arbitration
agreements impose element of manageability in area of conflicts of law doctrine).
168. See, e.g., Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393,
1399 (8th Cir. 1986) (court orders arbitration of 10(b) and lOb-5 claims under '34 Act pursuant
to arbitration agreement despite tradition in federal courts not to enforce arbitration agreements
in context of '34 Act); Schriner v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 635 F. Supp. 373, 374-75 (N.D. Calif.
1986) (same); Steinberg v. Illinois Co., Inc., 635 F. Supp. 615, 617-19 (N.D. Il1. 1986) (same);
Fisher v. Prudential Bache Securities, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 234, 235-37 (D. Md. 1986) (same);
Finkle and Ross v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1505, 1509 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same);
Prawer v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 642, 646 (D. Mass. 1985) (same); Ross v.
Mathis, 624 F. Supp. 110, 117 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (same); Land v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
617 F. Supp. 52, 54 (E.D. Va. 1985) (same); West v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 623 F.
Supp. 26, 28 (W.D. Wash. 1985) (same); Jarvis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 614 F. Supp.
1146, 1152 (D. Vt. 1985) (same); Byrd v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., [Current Binder] FED.
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10(b) and 10b-5 claims enforcing a predispute arbitration agreement. 69 The
Eighth Circuit stated that the federal policy favoring judicial enforcement of
arbitration agreements, the Supreme Court's questioning in Scherk of the ap-
plicability of Wilko to claims under the '34 Act, the statutory differences of
the '33 Act and '34 Act, and Justice White's concurrence in Byrd justified
ordering arbitration of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims. 7 Accordingly,
the Eighth Circuit ordered arbitration of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims
pursuant to a predispute arbitration agreement."'
Besides the Eigth Circuit, a number of federal district courts that have
ordered arbitration of claims under the '34 Act in accordance with arbitration
clauses have elaborated on the elements the district court found significant
in Byrd.72 For example, in Ross v. Mathis,7 1 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia noted that the United States
Supreme Court in Mitsubishi fervently endorsed judicial enforcement of
arbitration agreements. 4 Applying the principles the Supreme Court enun-
ciated in Mitsubishi, the Ross court found that a court would have to find
that Congress had expressed an intention to preclude a waiver of the judicial
rights encompassed in a statute to deny enforcement of an arbitration
agreement. 75 The district court, following Justice White's line of reasoning
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 92,225, at 91,641 (S.D. Calif. July 8, 1985) (same); Niven v. Dean Witter
Reynolds [1984-1985 TRANSFER BINDER] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,059, at 91,277 (M.D.
Fla. March 28, 1985) (same).
169. Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393, 1399 (8th Cir.
1986).
170. Id. at 1395-99; see supra notes 114-26 and accompanying text (discussing Justice
White's concurrence in Byrd questioning applicability of Wilko to '34 Act); supra notes 85-93
and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's analysis in Scherk of applicability of Wilko
to '34 Act).
171. Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, 795 F.2d at 1399.
172. See, e.g., Ross v. Mathis, 624 F. Supp. 110, 115-16 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (Supreme Court
has stressed that only congressional intent embodied in federal statutes overrides provisions of
Arbitration Act); Land v. Dean Witter, 617 F. Supp. 52, 54-55 (E.D. Va. 1985) (strong federal
policy favoring arbitration exists); Jarvis v. Dean Witter, 614 F. Supp. 1146, 1151-52 (D. Vt.
1985) (strong national policy favors judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements); see supra
note 168 (listing federal courts that have enforced arbitration agreements in context of claims
under '34 Act).
173. 624 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
174. Ross v. Mathis, 624 F. Supp. 110, 115-16; see supra notes 131-58 and accompanying
text (discussing Mitsubishi case and test developed by Supreme Court for evaluating whether
court should enforce predispute arbitration agreement).
175. Ross, 624 F. Supp. at 115-16. The Ross court set forth the two part inquiry the
Supreme Court enunciated in Mitsubishi. Id. First, a court should determine if the parties'
agreement reaches the statutory issues. Id. If the parties' agreement reaches the statutory issues,
the court determines whether the legal constraints of statutory language, congressional intent,
and contrary federal policy foreclose arbitration. Id. In Ross the written contract provided that
the parties agreed to arbitrate future disputes. Id.; see Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3353-55
(Supreme Court's two-part test for determining issue of enforceability of arbitration agreement);
supra note 15 (discussing factors that court should consider in determining whether parties
intended to arbitrate federal statutory claims).
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in Byrd, further stated that since Congress had not created a private cause
of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the '34 Act, the nonwaiver
provision in the '34 Act did not prohibit parties from using an arbitration
clause to waive a judicial forum. 76 The Ross court ultimately determined
that because the private right of action for claims under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 was a judicially created right, the parties were free to agree to
arbitration of future controversies effectively waiving the parties' private
right of action.'7
The Eighth Circuit and the federal district courts that enforce predispute
arbitration agreements in the context of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims
contrast markedly with a strong line of cases that continue to deny arbitration
of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims. 78 For example, in Conover v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., the Ninth Circuit thoroughly explained the rationale
and continued validity of applying Wilko to section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 
79
The Ninth Circuit discounted Justice White's theory that because the '34 Act
does not contain an explicit cause of action, as compared with the '33 Act, the
waiver provisions which compelled the Wilko Court to hold that persons
could not waive a right to arbitration were absent in the '34 Act.'8 The Ninth
Circuit turned to the legislative history to determine that Congress intended
to afford aggrieved investors a judicial forum that investors could not waive.' 8
176. Ross, 624 F. Supp. at 116; see supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (discussing
implied private right of action for claims arising under section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 of '34
Act); supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text (discussing Mitsubishi Court's determination
that Congress must express intention that parties can waive rights to judicial remedy as provided
in federal statute); supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing waiver provision in'34
Act).
177. Ross, 624 F. Supp. at 116-17.
178. Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 1197, 1201-02 (3d
Cir. 1986) (continuing to apply Wilko to section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 and denying enforcement
of predispute arbitration agreement); Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520, 525
(9th Cir. 1986) (same); McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94, 96-98 (2d
Cir. 1986) (same) cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3231 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1986) (No. 86-44); Miller v.
Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 850, 854 (lth Cir. 1986) (same); Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch & Co., 634 F. Supp. 587, 591-93 (S.D. Md. 1986) (same); Bustamante v. Rotan Mosle,
Inc., 633 F. Supp. 303, 306-07 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (same); Blomquist v. Churchill, 633 F. Supp.
131, 132-33 (D.S.C. 1985) (same); Bale v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 650, 654
(D. Minn. 1986) (same); Webb v. R. Rowland & Co., Inc., 613 F. Supp. 1123, 1124 (E.D. Mo.
1985) (appeal pending) (same); Adams v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Corp. [Current
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,328, at 92,174-75 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 20, 1985) (same);
Geller v. Nasser [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,227, at 91,649 (C.D. Calif.
June 27, 1985) (same); supra notes 159-67 and accompanying text (discussing uniform judicial
application of Wilko to claims under '34 Act).
179. Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520, 521-26 (9th Cir. 1986)
(explaining rationale for validity of invalidating predispute arbitration agreements in context of
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims).
180. Id.; see infra notes 181-84 and accompanying text (demonstrating means by which
Ninth Circuit disproves Justice White's theories); supra notes 64, 124 and accompanying text
(discussing waiver provisions of '33 Act and '34 Act).
181. Conover v. Dean Witter, 794 F.2d at 524-25. The Ninth Circuit looked to the fact
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Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit found that the federal securities laws were
related components of the federal securities laws to be considered together
to effectuate the Acts' remedial purposes."" Finally, the Ninth Circuit based
the Conover decision upon the dangers and drawbacks of arbitration that re-
quired that courts afford aggrieved investors a judicial forum with the in-
herent protections and opportunities allowed under the '34 Act.' 3 The Ninth
Circuit's reasoning and holding is mandated by a reading of the federal
securities laws, the case law, and public policy.'18
To demonstrate the validity of the Ninth Circuit's holding, as well as
those cases with which the Ninth Circuit is in agreement, initially requires
an attack on courts following Justice White's concurrence in Byrd which
initially requires an evaluation of the rules of statutory interpretation.' 5 A
court will consider extrinsic materials to discover congressional intent only
when the court cannot discover a statute's meaning from a literal reading of
the statutory language, when the court finds that a literal interpretation of
the words would distort the congressional intent, or when the court finds
that the statute is not explicit on an issue.8 6 Additionally, longstanding
judicial interpretation of a statute is an especially important aid to courts
because if the legislature did not agree with a court's interpretation of the
statute the legislature could have changed the law.'8 7 Furthermore, courts
that in the 1975 amendments Congress did not eliminate the private cause of action that courts
have imposed. Id. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit points to a report issued in the course of the
1975 Amendments in which Congress expressly recognized the validity of Wilko as existing law
governing the issue of arbitration between brokers and aggrieved investors. Id.; see H.R. REP.
No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 111, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 321,
342 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 229]; see infra notes 220-22 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Congress' statement that 1972 amendments to federal securities laws did not alter Wilko and
law following Wilko).
182. Conover v. Dean Witter, 794 F.2d at 525; see supra notes 35-49 and accompanying
text (discussing goals of federal securities laws); infra notes 209-14 and accompanying text
(demonstrating federal securities laws to be in pari materia).
183. Conover v. Dean Witter, 794 F.2d at 525-26. The Ninth Circuit found that the reasons
for nonarbitrability advanced in Wilko in the context of the '33 Act applied also to the '34
Act. Id. Specifically, the bargaining status in which a broker could weaken an investor's position
was similar in the '33 Act as well as the '34 Act. Id. The complexity and nature of securities
fraud are similar in the '33 Act as well as the '34 demanding the judicial direction the Wilko
Court found significant. Id. Finally, the '34 Act, like the '33 Act, affords investors a judicial
forum and venue that is not afforded in other business suits. Id. The '34 Act, as well as the
'33 Act do not require diversity to proceed in federal court. Id.
184. See infra notes 195-234 and accompanying text (demonstrating correctness of refusal
to enforce arbitration in context of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims).
185. See generally N. SINGER, 2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 45.01-58.06
(4th ed. 1984) (volume of treatise detailing rules of statutory construction) [hereinafter cited as
SINGER].
186. Id. §§ 46.05, 46.07. Among the extrinsic aids a court will use to determine the meaning
of a statute include the circumstances under which the legislature enacted the statute, the
mischief at which the legislature aimed the statute, and the objectives that the legislature
envisioned the statute achieving. Id. § 46.05.
187. Id. § 46.05.
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accord deference to interpretations of statutes by the administrative agency
charged with the administration of the statute because if the legislature
disagreed with the administrative agency's interpretation the legislature could
amend the law. 8 The public policy embodied in a statute has significant
influence on statutory interpretation. 8 9 In attempting to ascertain the public
policy of a statute, a court may refer to prior statutes to determine a
congressional design.190 Statutes that relate to the same object or person,
class of persons or objects or have the same purposes are in pari materia
and courts construe the statutes together.19' If the statutes are on the same
subject and the purposes of the two acts are consistent, a court will imply a
provision in one act that is absent in the other act) 92 Overall, the rules of
statutory construction are designed to assure that a statute's actual effect
coincides with the legislature's intended effect. 93
Applying the rules of statutory construction to Justice White's analysis
of the '33 and '34 Acts in the concurrence to Byrd suggests that Justice
White neglected to place great emphasis on the legislative intent embodied
in the federal securities laws. 94 Admittedly, Congress did not state expressly
in the statutory language that the '34 Act forbids waiver of a private cause
of action. 95 A court deciding whether Congress intended to preclude waiver
of a federal forum under the '34 Act, however, must examine the legislative
history to discover the congressional intent because Congress did not ex-
pressly consider the waiver issue.'96 Congress enacted the '34 Act to protect
188. Id.; see N.L.R.B. v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170,
177 (1981) (court pays great deference to administrative agency's interpretation of statute in
enforcing that statute); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969) (court
should follow construction of statute by agency charged with statute's execution unless com-
pelling evidence exists that administrative agency's interpretation is wrong).
189. SINGER, supra note 185, § 56.01. A loose definition of public policy is the outward
action of the values, norms, and ideals of a society. Id.
190. Id. § 56.02.
191. Id. §§ 51.01-51.03; see infra notes 211-14 and accompanying text (discussing '33 Act
and '34 Act as in pari materia).
192. SINGER, supra note 185, § 51.02.
193. Id. § 45.05.
194. See Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1244 (White, J. concurring) (Justice White's analysis of '33
and '34 Acts); infra notes 187-91 and accompanying text (demonstrating that Justice White's
analysis of '33 and '34 Acts failed to consider legislative history and intent); supra notes 114-
26 and accompanying text (discussing Justice White's analysis of '33 and '34 Acts); supra note
186 and accompanying text (literal interpretation of words of statute will not prevail if creates
result contrary to legislative intention); see also Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic
Aids in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U. L.Q. 2, 4 (1939) (solely reading
plain language of statute does not allow court to form concept of Congress's goal and intentions
with enactment of statute).
195. See supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text (legislative history for federal securities
laws demonstrates that Congress never addressed issue of arbitration of claims under '34 Act).
196. See SINGER, supra note 185, § 46.05. If the words of a statute are not explicit, a court
interpreting the statute must turn to extrinsic materials to discover the congressional intent
behind the statute. Id.; see also supra, H.R. REP. No. 229, supra note 181, at 11l. During
Congress' consideration of the 1975 amendments to the '34 Act, the House commented that
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investors from securities fraud by assuring that injured investors would
recover judicially imposed damages. 97 Justice White's analysis ignored the
congressional policies embodied in the '34 Act. 98 The Justice's failure to
consider the purposes of the '34 Act when construing the statutory text
violated the statutory interpretation precept that requires a court to construe
a statute in conformity with the statute's purposes.' 99 Furthermore, Justice
White's analysis of the '33 and '34 Acts did not consider that longstanding
judicial interpretations of statutes carry weight for another court interpreting
the statute.200 The reason for deference to longstanding judicial interpreta-
tions is that Congress could have altered the statute if Congress believed that
the judiciary failed to effectuate the congressional intent. 20 , The same ration-
ale applies to judicial deference to interpretations of the statute by the
administrative agency charged with the statute's administration. 20 2 The prac-
tical aspect of the deference to judicial and administrative interpretations of
a statute exists by allowing the public to rely on the longstanding tradition.
20 1
Courts consistently have held since Wilko that in the context of section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 claims predispute arbitration agreements are invalid. 20 4 Ad-
ditionally, the SEC has articulated on a number of occasions the opinion
that predispute arbitration agreements are unenforceable in the context of
fraud claims under both the '33 Act and the '34 Act. 20 5 Justice White's
the amendment to section 28 of the '34 Act regarding arbitration procedures between self-
regulatory organizations and member firms did not change the existing laws as articulated in
Wilko. H.R. REP. No. 229, supra note 181, at 111; see infra note 205 (SEC finds congressional
intent that arbitration agreements are invalid in context of claims arising under federal securities
laws).
197. See S. REP. No. 792, supra note 34, at 12 (equity demands that defrauded investors
recover judicially imposed remedies); supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (demonstrating
congressional intent that private cause of action exist for section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims).
198. See Byrd, 105 S.Ct. at 1244 (White, Jr. concurring) (Justice White's analysis of '33
and '34 Acts);SINGER, supra note 185, §§ 46.07,56.01. A literal interpretation of the words of
a statute should not prevail if the statute creates a result contrary to the apparent intent of the
legislature. Id. § 46.07. In Justice White's literal interpretation of the '34 Act, the Justice failed
to consider that Congress had expressed an intention that defrauded investors have judicial
remedies. Byrd, 105 S.Ct. at 1244.
199. See SINGER, supra note 185, § 45.13 (statutory construction rule requires that court
construes statute in accordance with spirit of statute to effectuate statute's purposes).
200. See id. § 49.05 (longstanding judicial interpretation of statute is entitled to great
deference when court interprets statutory provision).
201. See id. § 49.05.
202. Id.; see supra note 188 and accompanying text (courts accord great deference to
interpretations of statute by administrative agency charged with enforcing statute). But see Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 565-66 (1979) (limits on administrative
agency's interpretive capabilities exist in statutory language, history, and purpose).
203. SINGER, supra note 185, § 49.07.
204. See supra notes 157-67 and accompanying text (listing and discussing federal courts
since Wilko decision that have applied Wilko to '34 Act claims of fraud).
205. See Release No. 15,984 supra note 4, at 81,977. The SEC expressed the opinion that
predispute arbitration agreements are misleading because the agreements fail to inform investors
that an investor has the right to a judicial forum for claims arising out of the antifraud
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analysis failed to discuss the longstanding judicial and administrative interpre-
tation that section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims are nonarbitrable pursuant
to predispute arbitration agreements. 206 Justice White's analysis, as well as
lower district courts reliance on the Byrd concurrence, are flawed because
they ignore past judicial and administrative interpretations. 2°"
Finally, Justice White's analysis and the lower courts that have followed
the concurrence to Byrd failed to discuss that the '33 Act and '34 Act could
be in pari materia.20 8 A court can construe together two statutes that are in
pari materia because when the legislature enacted the later statute the
legislature viewed the two statutes as a whole embodying legislative policy
with the earlier statute influencing the interpretation of the later statute. 209
In addition, courts further harmony and consistency within the legal system
when courts construe statutes by referring to other statutes. 210 When courts
construe statutes together the courts further congressional intentions because
provisions of the '34 and '34 Acts. Id. at 977-78. The SEC stated that a broker employing an
arbitration agreement must inform the investor that the arbitration agreement was void in the
context of claims pursuant to the federal securities laws. Id. The SEC went as far as to prohibit
the use of predispute arbitration agreements by enacting Rule 15c2-2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2
(1985). Rule 15c2-2 declares as fraudulent a broker's use of predispute agreements attempting
to bind customers to arbitration of future controversies arising under the federal securities laws.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2(b). The Rule, however, allows brokers to use existing preprinted forms
that may include arbitration clauses until December 31, 1984. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2(b). The
Rule provides text for disclosure of the investor's rights to judicial redress that must accompany
the preprinted forms. Id. Furthermore, all customers that signed a contract containing an
arbitration agreement are entitled to the same disclosure. Id.; see also SEC Securities Exchange
Release No. 19,813 (May 26, 1983) (SEC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Rule 15c2-2),
reprinted in [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,356, at 85,966 [hereinafter
cited as Release No. 19,813). The SEC stated that the purpose of Rule 15c2-2 was to codify
the longstanding view that predispute arbitration agreements are inconsistent with section 10(b)'s
prohibition of deceptive practices. Release No. 19,813, supra, at 85,967. The SEC indicated that
the legislative history of the 1975 securities acts amendments indicated a congressional awareness
and approval of case law interpretations of the federal securities laws that predispute agreements
are invalid. Id. at n.7. The SEC recognized that an exception exists for international contracts.
Id. at n.8; Release No. 20,397, supra note 4, at 86,356 (SEC announces adoption of Rule 15c2-2).
Virtually all the commentators who submitted comments to the SEC during the rulemaking period
agreed that statutory law and case law rendered unenforceable agreements to arbitrate future
controversies under the federal securities laws. Release No. 20,397, supra note 4, at 86,357-60.
206. Byrd, 105 S.Ct. at 1244 (White, J. concurring); see supra notes 159-67 and accom-
panying text (discussing judicial and administrative tradition of not enforcing arbitration
agreements in context of claims under federal securities laws).
207. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (showing that failure to discuss and accord
deference to past judicial and administrative interpretations violates norms of statutory inter-
pretation).
208. See SINGER, supra note 185, § 51.03 (defining in pari materia). Statutes are in pari
materia when they relate to the same thing or person, the same class of persons or things, or
have the same purpose or objective. Id. In addition, statutes that condemn the same act are in
pari materia. Id.
209. SINGER, supra note 185, § 51.03.
210. Id. § 53.01.
[Vol. 43:923
PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
when Congress enacts a statute, Congress places the proposed legislation
within the existing framework of other statutes intending the new statute to
work in harmony with the existing laws. 211 In the context of the federal
securities laws, courts have construed the '33 Act and '34 Act together
because the Acts are in pari materia.212 Furthermore, Congress evinced an
intent that the '34 Act was a continuation of a plan initiated with the '33
Act to protect the general investing public. 21a Although the '33 Act provides
for investor recourse to a judicial forum and the '34 Act does not expressly
provide a private cause of action, the intention in the '33 Act that defrauded
investors have a guaranteed right to judicial remedies can be superimposed
on the '34 Act because the Acts are in pari materia.
214
Lower courts should not rely on Justice White's analysis of the '33 Act
and '34 Act when considering the arbitrability of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-
5 claims because of the incomplete nature of the Justice's analysis. 2 5 Lower
courts, however, also have used a Supreme Court trend strenuously enforcing
arbitration agreements to justify enforcement of arbitration agreements in
the context of the '34 Act. 2 6 The trend finds impetus in the less costly and
less time-consuming nature of arbitration.2 7 Federal district courts have
211. Id.
212. Axelrod v. Kordich, Victor & Neufeld, 451 F.2d 838, 843 (2d Cir. 1971) ('33 Act and
'34 Act are in pari materia); In re Revenue Properties Litiga. Cases, 451 F.2d 310, 313 (Ist Cir.
1971) (First Circuit agrees with United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York that the '33 Act and '34 Act are in pari materia); Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287 F.
Supp. 766, 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ('33 Act and '34 Act are in pari materia).
213. See 78 CoNw. REc. 2264 (1934) (statement of Senator Fletcher introducing S.2693),
reprinted in 4 LEois.ATrWv HISTORY OF THE SEcuTrnEs ACT OF 1933 AND SECuRITIES EXCHANGE
ACT OF 1934 (1973). Senator Fletcher stated that Senate Bill 2693 was one of a series of steps
taken to protect the investing public. Id. As such, the '34 Act could be seen as in pari materia
with the '33 Act in the eyes of Congress. See id.; see also SINGER, supra note 185, § 48.13
(explanatory statements by congressman introducing bill are admissible aids for court use in
interpreting statute).
214. See supra notes 209-14 and accompanying text (demonstrating that '33 and '34 Acts
are in pari materia and may be construed together); supra note 191 and accompanying text
(defining in pari materia).
215. See supra notes 194-213 and accompanying text (demonstrating failure of Justice
White's concurrence to adequately interpret '33 and '34 Acts).
216. See supra notes 168-76 and accompanying text (listing and discussing lower federal
courts that have discerned Supreme Court intent that arbitration clauses are enforceable in
context of federal securities laws); supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme
Court cases to which lower courts turn to find Court endorsement of strenuous judicial
enforcement of arbitration agreements).
217. See Finkle and Ross v. A.G. Becker Paribas, 622 F. Supp. 1505, 1509 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (greater support in Supreme Court for arbitration as a means of expeditiously resolving
disputes); see also Mitsubishi, 105 S.Ct. at 3355 (Arbitration Act requires courts to liberally
construe arbitration agreements unless congressional intention expressed statutorily to preclude
arbitration agreements); Moses, 460 U.S. at 24-25 (Arbitration Act requires that courts resolve
doubts concerning scope of arbitration agreement in favor of arbitration); Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) (detailing differences between judicial
proceeding and arbitration that make arbitration desirable to parties); supra notes 25-26 and
accompanying text (discussing speedy and efficient nature of arbitration proceedings).
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stated that the Mitsubishi Court established the means for the consideration
of the validity of a predispute arbitration agreement. 28 The essential deter-
mination that a court must make is whether Congress has evinced an intention
to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.
21 9
The only time that Congress expressly mentioned the issue of arbitration
under the '34 Act was in 1975 in the context of amending section 28 of the
'34 Act220 Congress stated that the amendment regulating arbitration between
self-regulatory organizations and the organizations' members did not change
existing law as articulated in Wilko. 22' Congress' discussion of arbitration in
the context of amending section 28 of the '34 Act occurred in 1975 at a time
when all federal courts accepted as law that Wilko required courts to refuse
specific enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements in the context of
claims under the fraud sections of both the '33 Act and the '34 Act.
222
Congress, therefore, knew and approved of the preclusion of waiver of rights
to a judicial forum under the '33 and '34 Acts. Furthermore, the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC), the administrative agency charged with en-
forcing the federal securities laws, has expressed the opinion that the goal
of protecting investors from fraudulent brokers mandates that judicial forums
protect the investing public. 223 The SEC's interpretation that the federal
securities laws mandate a judicial forum is entitled to significant deference
because Congress designated the SEC the agency for enforcing the federal
securities laws in accord with congressional intentions.224
The nature of an arbitration proceeding supports the SEC's fear of
arbitration's inability to adequately protect the investor. 225 The United States
218. See Finkle and Ross v. A.G. Becker Paribas, 622 F. Supp. at 1509-10. In Finkle and
Ross v. A.G. Becker Paribas, the New York court stated that under Mitsubishi the court had
to determine if Congress evinced an intention to preclude the parties' arbitration agreement if
the parties actually had agreed to arbitration. Id. The Finkle court held that Wilko's solicitude
for the special right to a private cause of action present in the '33 Act did not cover the '34
Act because the judiciary, rather than Congress, created a private cause of action for claims
under the '34 Act. Id.
219. See Mitsubishi, 105 S.Ct. at 3355 (Congress must evince intention through statutory
text or legislative history to preclude party's waiver of right to judicial forum).
220. See H.R. REP. No. 229, supra note 196, at 342 (noting that amendments governing
arbitration between self regulatory organizations and their members did not alter existing law
as stated in Wilko).
221. Id.
222. See supra notes 169-76 and accompanying text (listing and discussing federal courts
enforcing predispute arbitration agreements in context of claims arising under federal securities
laws); notes 178-84 and accompanying text (listing and discussing courts continuing tradition of
invalidating predispute arbitration agreements).
223. See supra note 205 and accompanying text (describing SEC statements that Wilko
precludes arbitration of federal securities laws claims).
224. See supra note 188 and accompanying text (describing degree of deference accorded
interpretations by enforcing agency).
225. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) (listing
differences between judicial proceeding and arbitration proceeding). See generally DoMcE, supra
note 3, § 29.06 at 435-38, § 27.01 at 411-12 (discussing faults of arbitration); Neville, supra
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Supreme Court noted that the characteristics differentiating an arbitral
tribunal from a judicial tribunal may affect significantly the ultimate outcome
of the dispute.? 6 For example, an arbitration proceeding lacks the account-
ability of judicial proceedings. 227 Additionally, arbitration does not afford
the parties extensive pretrial discovery. 228 Full pretrial discovery, however,
would harm the speed and efficiency of arbitration. 229 Furthermore, the speed
and efficiency of the arbitral process would suffer if the law required a
complete explanation, record, and findings of fact.20 Finally, arbitrators are
often attorneys who bring to arbitration an expertise in a field that judges
may lack. 21 Overall, the advantages of arbitration provide for speedy and
inexpensive resolution by persons with knowledge in the area of the dispute.
232
If the arbitration proceedings provided the necessary protections that Con-
gress envisioned securities investors to need, the Wilko restraint on the
validity of arbitration agreements could be abolished. 233 Courts could abolish
note 50, at 10 (discussing dangers inherent in arbitration proceeding); Comment, supra note
164, at 129-30 (judicial forum necessary for supervision of securities industry through use of
private civil actions).
226. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic, 350 U.S. at 203. In Bernhardt the Supreme Court
noted that the character of the forum in which a party brings his claims becomes an important
part of the rights supporting the party's cause of action. Id.
227. See id. (law does not require that arbitrators give written opinions); DOME, supra
note 3, § 29.06 at 435-36 (arbitrators do not submit rationale for award to avoid jeopardizing
speed and efficiency of arbitration); Note, supra note 164, at 129 (arbitrator lacks accountability
of judge because opinions of arbitrator are not published).
228. See DomxE, supra note 3, § 27.01 at 411-12 (arbitration proceedings are not subject
to broad discovery rights embodied in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). While parties might
provide in the arbitration agreement for traditional full discovery rights, the standardized nature
of arbitration clauses suggests that an investor would not possess bargaining power on the issue.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text (explaining standard format of arbitration agreements
and their nonnegotiable nature).
229. See Neville, supra note 50, at 10 (full pretrial discovery in arbitration proceeding
would prolong arbitration and thus defeat goals of speedy dispute resolution). See generally
Kinman, The Quantum of Discovery vs. the Quality of Justice: More is Less, 4 LrnGATION 8,
8 (1977) (discussing prolonging effects and increased costs attendant to discovery in litigation).
230. See Neville, supra note 50, at 10 (speed and efficiency of arbitration would be harmed
if law required that arbitrator's publish opinions); DOmKE, supra note 3, § 29.06 at 435-38
(same).
231. See Neville, supra note 50, at 10 (arbitrators usually are knowledgeable in subject
matter of controversy).
232. See Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53 FORDHAm L. REV.
279, 283 (1984) (advantages of arbitration are present only if arbitration proceeding is fair in
fact and appearance).
233. See id. at 312-13 Katsoris suggests that if arbitration proceedings are proven to be
fair and the public participates in the administrative process of securities arbitration, the Wilko
rule could be abolished because Congress' interests in protecting rights of the securities investors
would be saved. Id.; see also SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 12,974 [1976-1977
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,807, at 87,103-104 (SEC authorizes creation
of committee to study the development of a uniform system of dispute resolution). The Securities
Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA) was established to develop a uniform system of ar-
bitration of securities disputes. Id.; Katsoris, supra note 232, at 280-91 (discussing and describing
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the Wilko rule, however, only upon congressional indication that the arbitral




Congress stated that the central purpose of the federal securities laws is
the protection of the investing public.235 Furthermore, Congress has evinced
an intention that judicial remedies are essential to the preservation of the
investor's rights under the federal securities laws."2 6 While the Arbitration
Act and Supreme Court decisions require judicial enforcement of arbitration
agreements, enforcement is not mandatory if grounds exist at law or in
equity that preclude judicial enforcement of an arbitration agreement. 23 7 The
grounds as law include statutory language and congressional intent.23 Con-
gress must evidence an intent that arbitration proceedings protect investors
to the same degree as judicial proceedings before predispute arbitration
agreements will become judicially enforceable in the context of claims of
fraud under the '33 and '34 Acts. 2 9 Since Congress has not evidenced such
an intent, courts cannot enforce predispute agreements to arbitrate either
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims or any other fraud claims arising under
the '33 Act and '34 Act.
G. MONIQUE ESCUDERO
SICA's ultimate proposals). The issue of predispute arbitration agreements was beyond the scope
of SICA's discussions. Katsoris, supra note 232, at 296. SICA prefaced the final version of the
Arbitration Procedure Booklet with an explanation of the right to a judicial forum required under
Wilko. Id. at 223 n.124. The distinction between agreeing to arbitration before a dispute arises
and after a dispute arises is significant. Comment, supra note 164, at 137-38. For example, once
an investor is aware of a controversy, the investor will be more likely to investigate the desirabil-
ity of using arbitration. Id. at 137. Furthermore, the purpose of the nonwaiver provisions and
Wilko is to allow the investor to make an intelligent choice of forums and not to preclude volun-
tary arbitration. Id. A predispute agreement prevents an investor from voluntarily waiving the
investor's right to a judicial forum. Id.
234, See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text (Congress evinced intention that rights
of investors embodied in federal securities laws must be judicially protected).
235. See supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text (demonstrating that central feature of
federal securities laws is protection of investing public).
236. See supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text (Congress expressly provided in statutory
language of '33 Act that investors cannot waive rights, including right to judicial forum); notes
42-48, 220-24 and accompanying text (legislative history of '34 Act demonstrates that Congress
intended to preclude waiver of right to judicial forum).
237. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text (describing grounds on which court is
not required to enforce arbitration agreements).
238. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text (judicial enforcement of arbitration
agreements is mandatory unless Congress evinced an intention in a federal statute that arbitration
is improper).
239. See supra notes 219-22 and accompanying text (Congress must indicate that arbitration
provides adequate protection of investors' rights under federal securities laws).
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